In wireless sensor networks, self-healing key-distribution schemes are used to ensure that, even if the message packets that are broadcast in some sessions get lost, the group nodes can still recover the lost session keys simply by using their personal secret keys and broadcast messages that have been received without requesting additional transmissions from the group manager. These schemes reduce network traffic, decrease the group manager's workload, and lower the risk of node exposure through traffic analysis. However, most existing schemes have many deficiencies, such as high overhead for storage and communication and collusion attacks. In this paper, we have proposed a modified, self-healing, key-distribution scheme based on one-way key chains and secret sharing. Our scheme has the properties of constant storage, lower communication overhead, long lifespan, forward secrecy, backward secrecy, and resistance to collusion attacks.
Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are composed of a large number of sensor nodes with limited power, storage, computation, and communication capabilities. WSNs have wide applications in military operations and scientific exploration [1, 2] in which there may be inadequate support by the infrastructure of the network, allowing adversaries to potentially intercept, modify, or partially interrupt communication. In such applications, security is a critical concern. In addition, in some deployment scenarios, sensor nodes must operate under adversarial conditions. Therefore, determining how to distribute group session keys for secure communication to a large dynamic group over an unreliable network is a serious issue. In WSNs, packet loss occurs frequently. Messages that are broadcast by the group manager (base station) might never reach some authorized nodes (sensor nodes). So, it is important to guarantee the reliable transmission of information for updating the group's session keys to the authorized nodes. An easy solution is requesting retransmission, but requesting retransmission increases the overhead associated with communication incurs a high risk of revealing the nodes' physical locations, which is not acceptable in some high-security environments.
A self-healing, key-distribution scheme is proposed to solve the problem described above. The main concept of selfhealing, key-distribution schemes is that, even if the message packets that are broadcast in some sessions get lost, the group nodes can still recover the lost session keys simply by using their personal secret keys and broadcast messages that have been received without requesting additional transmissions from the group manager. These schemes reduce network traffic, decrease the group manager's workload, and lower the risk of node exposure through traffic analysis. Figure 1 shows network topology in a key distribution scheme under adversarial conditions.
In 2002, Staddon et al. [3] proposed the first self-healing, key-distribution scheme with revocation using secret sharing [4] . However, Staddon et al.'s schemes incur high overhead for storage and communication. Later, several other schemes were proposed [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] based on Staddon et al.'s schemes. Liu et al. (2003) generalized the definitions and security notions and proposed a new scheme that significantly decreased the overhead for communication by introducing a novel, personal key-distribution [5] . Blundo et al. [10] showed that the first scheme in [3] is insecure. An adversary could recover the group's session key with just broadcast messages. In [11] , Dutta et al. proposed two self-healing, key-distribution schemes with revocation that were secure, but they did not consider collusion attacks. In [12] , Dutta et al. proposed a new self-healing key-distribution scheme with a constant storage overhead by using only one secret polynomial. But Xu and He's scheme [13] and Du and He's scheme [14] showed that the scheme in [12] was insecure. Any user can recover the manager's secret polynomial, which should not been known by any user. Xu and He (2009) proposed two schemes in [13] , one of which improved the scheme in [12] by using an access polynomial instead of the revocation polynomial with the other, which was based on the scheme in [11] , still using an access polynomial. But neither of the two schemes proposed in [13] considered collusion attacks between the revoked user and the newly-joined user. In [14] , Du and He proposed a new self-healing, key-distribution scheme with revocation and resistance to collusion attacks. However, Bao and Zhang (2011) showed that the scheme in [14] was vulnerable to collusion attacks [15] . A revoked user and a newly-joined user easily could recover the session keys that they should not know. However, Bao and Zhang (2011) used m secret polynomials for m sessions and an access polynomial in the broadcast phase, which resulted in an excessive communication overhead.
In this paper, we propose a self-healing key-distribution scheme for WSNs based on one-way key chains and secret sharing. In our scheme, only one secret polynomial is used in all sessions, and modified access polynomials are used, which produces a lower communication overhead. Also, our scheme can resist collusion attacks between a newly-joined user and a revoked user.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the security model is presented and Bao and Zhang's scheme [15] is reviewed briefly. In Section 3, our modified, selfhealing, key-distribution scheme is proposed. Then, we discuss the security and performance of our scheme in Section 4. Our conclusions are presented in Section 5.
Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly introduce Bao and Zhang's scheme [15] and the security definitions. The following notations will be used in the rest of the paper.
U is the set of all users (sensor nodes) in wireless sensor networks.
u i is the identity of U i .
GM is the group manager (base station).
n is the total number of users in U. m is the total number of sessions.
t is the maximum number of compromised users in all sessions.
p is a large prime modulus, where 2 799 < p < 2 800 .
q is a large prime divisor of p − 1, where 2 159 < q < 2 160 and q 2 | (p − 1).
is the secret polynomial of degree t generated by GM.
S i is the personal secret of user U i .
B j is the broadcast message generated by GM for session j. β j is the self-healing key generated by GM for session j.
K j is the session key in session j generated by GM.
K 0 is the initial key seed generated by GM.
R j is the set of all revoked users in and before session j.
G j is the set of nonrevoked users in session j. (a) For any nonrevoked user U i in session j, the group session key K j is efficiently determined by the broadcast message B j and the personal secret S i .
(b) The group session key K j cannot be determined by what the non-revoked users learn from B j or their own personal secret alone.
(c) t-revocation capability: for each session j, let R j denote a set of revoked users in and before session j, where |R j | ≤ t, the group manager can generate a broadcast message B j such that all the revoked users in R j cannot recover the group session key K j .
(d) Self-healing property: any U i who joins in or before session j 1 and is not revoked before session
by the broadcast messages B j1 , B j2 , and the personal secret S i .
Definition 2 (t-wise forward secrecy [11] ). Let R j ⊆ U denote a set of all revoked users in and before session j, where |R j | ≤ t. A key-distribution scheme guarantees forward secrecy if the members in R j together cannot get any information about K j , even with the knowledge of group session keys before session j.
Definition 3 (t-wise backward secrecy [11] ). Let J j ⊆ U denote a set of users who join the group after session j, where |J j | ≤ t. A key-distribution scheme guarantees backward secrecy if the members in J j together cannot get any information about K j , even with the knowledge of group session keys after session j.
Definition 4 (resistance to the collusion attack [16] ). Let R ⊆ U denote a set of all revoked users in and before session j 1 and let J ⊆ U denote a set of users who join the group after session j 2 , where 1 ≤ j 1 < j 2 and |R ∪ J| ≤ t. A key-distribution scheme with resistance to collusion attacks means that, even if all users in R and J cooperate, they cannot get any information about keys K j , for all j 1 < j < j 2 .
Review of Bao and Zhang's Scheme. In [15], Bao and
Zhang proposed an improved key-distribution scheme for [14] that included resistance to collusion attacks. The scheme is divided into the four phases described below.
Phase 1: Setup. First, the GM randomly chooses m polyno-
, each of degree t. Second, the GM randomly chooses numbers α 1 , . . . , α m ∈ F p for each session.
Third, the GM chooses a random secret value t i ∈ F p for user U i and the t i values are different from each other. Then, the GM sends the personal secret S i = {t i , α j , f j (t i )} to user U i in a secure manner. (The term j denotes the session number when the user joins the group and α j ∈ {α 1 , . . . , α m }. ) Then, the GM randomly chooses a prime, initial key seed K 0 ∈ F p , which is kept secret and m numbers {β j } m j=1 ∈ F p as the self-healing keys.
The GM computes a key seed and corresponding key chain for each session using two one-way hash functions H 1 , H 2 and m numbers {β j } m j=1
. For 1 ≤ j ≤ m, the key seed of session j is computed as shown:
And the key chain of session j of length j is computed as shown:
where H i 2 () means applying the hash operation i times. Then,
j } is the key chain of session j, and the group session key in session j is
Phase 2: Broadcast. Let U actj = {U act1 , . . . , U acta j } be the set of all active users for session j, where a j is the number of active users in session j. Let T actj = {t act1 , . . . , t acta j } be the set of all active users' secret values in session j. Then, the GM generates
j } of size j as a masking key sequence for session j by applying XOR on both α j , and every key forms the key chain of session j, where
In session j, the GM broadcasts the following message:
where
is an access polynomial. When an active user U acti receives the broadcast message B j of session j, U acti can evaluate A j j (t acti ) = 1 by using its secret value t acti , where j denotes that U acti has joined the group in session j . However, a revoked user can only evaluate a random value.
Phase 3: Group Session Key and Self-Healing Key Recovery. When a nonrevoked user U i in session j, who joins in the group in session j , receives the broadcast message B j of session j, U i can recover the group session key K j as follows.
First,
, where α j is secret value of U i .
Then U i can compute all the future keys {K
j } in the key chain of session j by using the oneway hash function H 2 (). The group session key of session j is
(β j )} by using the corresponding keys {K
However, a revoked user can recover neither the group session key nor the self-healing keys of session j, since A j j (t i ) is a random number for any user U i ∈ R j .
Phase 4: Add Group Members. If a new user wants to join the group in session j, the GM chooses a never-used identity v ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} for U v . Then, the GM selects a random secret value t v ∈ F p and sends the personal secret key S v = {t v , α j , f j (t v )} to U v using RSA algorithm.
The Proposed Scheme
In this section, we propose an improved version of Bao and Zhang's scheme [15] using secret sharing. In our scheme, we use only one secret polynomial and modified access polynomials, which lower the communication overhead. Our scheme is divided into four phases, as follows. for each session. Second, the GM selects a unique identity u i ∈ F q for user U i and sends S i = {u i , α j , f (u i ) mod q} to user U i for i = 1, . . . , n as personal secret keys via a secure communication channel, where j denotes the session number when the user joined the group. For example, user U r , who joins the group in session 1, will receive S r = {u r , α 1 , f (u r ) mod q}.
Then, the GM randomly chooses a prime initial key seed K 0 ∈ F p , which is kept secret, and m numbers {β j } m j=1 ∈ F p as the self-healing keys.
In our scheme, as in Du-He's scheme [14] , we still use key chains. The GM computes a key seed and corresponding key chain for each session using two one-way hash functions H 1 , H 2 and m numbers {β j } m j=1
. For 1 ≤ j ≤ m, the key seed of session j is computed by (1):
And the key chain of session j of length j is computed by (2): 
where Then, the GM broadcasts the following message B j :
Phase 3: Group Session Key Recovery and Self-Healing Key
Recovery. When a non-revoked user U i , who joins the group in session j , receives the broadcast message B j of session j, he or she can recover g f (0) j by Lagrange's interpolation using B j and her or his personal secret keys as following:
With
, then he or she
by (5) with A j j (x) = 1, as follows:
where j denotes the session number when U i joined the group, and α j is the secret of user U i distributed by the GM when he or she joins the group in session j . Then, U i computes the group session key of session j as
User U i also can recover the self-healing key
j } in the key chain of session j by using the one-way hash function H 2 (). Then,
the user with session key K j can recover all session keys between session j to j based on (1) and (2) .
A user who was revoked in session j cannot recover the current group session key or the self-healing key even with the B j , since he or she cannot recover g f (0) j based on Lagrange's interpolation.
Phase 4: New User Added. If a user U x wishes to be added to the group in session j, GM chooses a unique and never-used identity u x for U x and sends the secret S x = {u x , α j , f (u x ) mod q} to U x using the RSA algorithm.
Security and Performance Analyses
In this section, we show that our proposed scheme has self-healing property, forward security, backward security, and resistance to collusion attacks. Compared with Bao and Zhang's scheme [15] , our scheme has lower communication overhead.
Self-Healing Property.
Assume that U i , who join the group in session j , are active in session j 1 and session j 2 , where 1 ≤ j ≤ j 1 ≤ j 2 . And U i receive session-key broadcast messages B j1 and B j2 but lose the session key broadcast message B j , where j 1 < j < j 2 . Users U i can still recover all the lost session keys K j for j 1 < j < j 2 as follows. by (5) and (9), where
j2 } in the key chain of session j 2 by using the one-way hash function H 2 (). Then, U i can recover {β j , β j +1 , . . . , β j1 , . . . , β j2 } using the keys {K
(3) With K j1 and {β j1 , . . . , β j2 }, U i can recover all session keys K j for j 1 < j < j 2 by (1) and (2).
Therefore, our scheme achieves the self-healing property.
Forward Secrecy.
Let R j ⊆ U and |R j | ≤ t be the set of all revoked users in and before session j, respectively. Then, we show that the coalition R j cannot get any information about the current session key K j , even with the previous group session keys before session j. To recover the session key when g j = g j1 g j2 . But in our scheme, the probability is 2 −160 , which is extremely low and can be almost neglected. After all, the coalition R j cannot get any information about the current session key K j .
The above analysis shows that our scheme is forward secure.
Backward Secrecy.
Let J j ⊆ U, where |J j | ≤ t, be the set of all users who join the group after session j. We will show that the coalition J j cannot get any information about any previous session key K j1 for j 1 ≤ j, even with the knowledge of group keys after session j.
Users However, users in J j could attempt to recover the previous session keys by their personal secret keys and the previous broadcast messages. However, by (5) and (6), it is evident that the previous broadcast messages do not have the equations for users in J j . So users in J j cannot recover the previous session keys.
The above analysis shows that our scheme is backward secure.
Resistance to Collusion
Attack. Let R j1 ⊆ U be the set of all revoked users in and before session j 1 + 1 and let J j2 ⊆ U be the set of all users who join the group from session j 2 . We will show that collusion of R j1 and J j2 cannot recover any session key K j ( j 1 < j < j 2 ) with their personal secret keys and the broadcast message B j1 and B j2 .
To recover session key K j ( j 1 < j < j 2 ), R j1 ∪ J j2 must recover the self-healing keys β j1+1 , β j1+2 , . . . , β j2−1 . Without loss of generality, assume that U a joins the group in session j 1 cannot recover the self-healing keys β j1+1 , β j1+2 , . . . , β j2−1 and session key K j ( j 1 < j < j 2 ). The above analysis shows that our scheme can resist collusion attacks.
Constant Storage Overhead and Lower Communication
Overhead. Our scheme has a constant storage overhead, which comes only from the user's personal secret keys {u i , α j , f (u i ) mod q}. So, the storage overhead is (3 log p) bits.
In our scheme, we use only one secret polynomial and modified access polynomials, which lower the communication overhead. The communication overhead is (a j + 3j + 2t + 1) log p, where t is the maximum number of revoked users, and a j is the number of active users in session j. Table 1 shows the comparison among the different schemes.
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a modified and an improved version of Bao and Zhang's scheme. Our scheme uses only one secret polynomial and modified access polynomials, which achieve a lower communication overhead. In addition, our scheme has the properties of constant storage, long lifespan, forward secrecy, backward secrecy, and resistance to collusion attacks. And, compared with the previous schemes, our proposed scheme is an efficient and secure, self-healing, key-distribution scheme for WSNs.
